The first element in White’s theory of cultural evolution is a division of culture into three subsystems: technological, sociological, and ideological.
The technological system is composed of the material, mechanical, physical and chemical instruments, together with the
techniques of their use, by means of which man, as an animal
species, is articulated with his natural habitat. . . . The sociological system is made up of interpersonal relations expressed
in patterns of behavior, collective as well as individual. The
ideological system is composed of ideas, beliefs, knowledge,
expressed in articulate speech or other symbolic form. (White
1949:362–363)
In a later work, White suggested four categories of culture:
technological, sociological, ideological, and “sentimental or attitudinal” (1959a:6–7). The attitudinal category attempts to capture “the feelings or attitudes that constitute the subjective
aspect.” White did not really develop this category, it is almost
an afterthought. He briefly refers to the culturally transmitted
feelings about things—“loathing of milk, attitudes toward
chastity, snakes, bats, death, etc.”—a motley assortment of sentiments that reinforce the haphazard impression of this element of
White’s theory.
This reflects the firm priority that White gave to the technological realm of culture. White viewed the technological, sociological, and ideological systems as a three-part hierarchy of
causation, with technology the foundation on which social and
ideological systems are raised. White wrote,
The technological system is basic and primary. Social systems
are functions of technologies; and philosophies express technological forces and reflect social systems. The technological
factor is therefore the determinant of a cultural system as a
whole. . . . This is not to say, of course, that social systems do
not condition the operation of technologies, or that social and
technological systems are not affected by ideologies. They do
and are. But to condition is one thing; to determine, quite another. (1949:366)
Why does technology—broadly defined—have a determinant role? Why does White posit that technology is the basis of
cultural evolution? First, there is the obvious fact that all organisms must meet basic energy requirements, be protected from
the elements, and defend themselves from enemies. These lifesustaining, life-perpetuating processes, White writes, “are technological in a broad, but valid, sense, i.e., they are carried on by
material, mechanical, biophysical, and biochemical means”
(1959a:19). By meeting these fundamental requisites of life, the
technological dimensions allow other elements of culture to occur. “The technological system is therefore both primary and basic in importance: all human life and culture rest and depend
upon it” (White 1949:365).
But more than technological potential, technology itself determines the nature of social and ideological systems:
The social organization of a people is not only dependent upon
their technology but is determined to a great extent, if not
wholly, by it both in form and content. . . . The activities of
hunting, fishing, gathering, farming, tending herds and flocks,
mining, and all the processes by means of which raw materials
are transformed and made ready for human consumption are
not merely technological processes; they are social processes as
well. (White 1959a:19–20)
And thus—to cite some of White’s examples—a railroad
workers’ union is based on the technological fact of having a
railroad and the social institutions formed by the existence of the
railroad (White 1959a:21). Technology determines concepts of female beauty: “In cultures where technological control over food
supply is slight and food is frequently scarce as a consequence,
a fat woman is often regarded as beautiful. In cultures where
food is abundant and women work little, obesity is likely to be
regarded as unsightly[!]” (White 1959a:21).
We will object to the accuracy of such claims below, but for
the moment it is more important to understand the logic behind
White’s theory: technology determines other aspects of culture.
Thus White—echoing Malinowski’s statements about the relationship between magic and science—suggests that as technological control increases, belief in the supernatural diminishes,
stating, for example, that “where the ceramic art is well developed, a minimum of magic is employed” (1959a:23). Again, this
may not be accurate, but the argument is clear.
By arguing that technological dimensions were primary factors, that technology was the bedrock of cultural development,
White set the stage for his theory of cultural evolution. If technology was an attempt to solve the problems of survival and if
this ultimately meant capturing enough energy and diverting it
to human needs, then those societies that captured more energy
and used it most efficiently were at an adaptive advantage; they
were, in an evolutionary sense, more advanced. Note here that
by energy White is thinking like a physicist, considering energy
in all of its states: as human effort, as fossil fuel, as kilocalories
stored in corn or other domesticated foods, as falling water, as
explosives, and so on.
From White’s perspective, “Culture thus confronts us as an
elaborate thermodynamic, mechanical system. . . . The functioning of culture as a whole therefore rests upon and is determined
by the amount of energy harnessed and by the way it is put to
work” (1949:367–368).
This implied that the differences between cultures could be
measured, not by some rough qualitative scale or “ethnical periods,” but precisely in terms of horsepower or kilocalories or another unit of measure.
The degree of cultural development, measured in terms of
amount of human need-serving goods and services produced
per capita, is determined by the amount of energy harnessed
per capita and by the efficiency of the technological means
with which it is put to work. We express this concisely and succinctly with the following formula: E X T→ C, in which C represents the degree of cultural development, E the amount of
energy harnessed per capita per year, and T the quality of efficiency of the tools employed in the expenditure of energy. We
can now formulate the basic law of cultural evolution: Other
factors remaining constant, culture evolves as the amount of
energy harnessed per capita per year is increased, or as the efficiency of the instrumental means of putting the energy to
work is increased. Both factors may increase simultaneously of
course. (White 1949:368–369)
With this elegant argument, White made thermodynamics
into the bridging argument of cultural evolution, transforming
intuitive classification of different societies into a series of propositions that were logical, testable, and lawlike. If, as Marvin Harris argues, White’s law of evolution “is neither a law nor a
definition but rather a statement of research strategy” (1968:636),
it is worthwhile noting that previous evolutionary approaches
lacked this predictive quality, instead being ex post facto classifications. White’s statement was lawlike in a scientific sense, not
a legal one: it stated a relationship between a set of observable
phenomena that could be proven incorrect or falsified. This
property of refutability sets scientific statements apart from
other kinds of statements, and it suggests White’s intentions
when he outlined a science of culture.